frankly drugs scare me, it’s just that people on drugs cannot be reasoned with, they will probably kill you even if you do not have any plans on trying to fight back when being mugged, or the like. It’s like in poker, I actually don’t fear the rational players, it’s the irrational players who doesn’t have a lot of logic in their playing that is very hard to beat. This is because you get beaten by hands that you assume wouldn’t be possible because they would have folded already with such.
This is something concrete that can be asked to Presidential Aspirants. Do they even know of these almost 20 year recommendation? The Drug problem in the Philippines is worsening because poverty is worsening, producing a spiral of crime-poverty-addiction. We are a poor country and to not know what the most cost efficient way to combat the Drug Problem is a big question mark in any Presidential Candidates armor. We must be asking these questions.
PS: Legalize marijuana now!!!!
PSS: Notice that in a lot of our problems the Pareto Principle is at work 80-20 90-10;. For me at least someone worthy of leading our beautiful and somewhat seemingly damned country should know the those places where we could put the Pareto Principle to work.
“If you had asked me at the outset,” Everingham says, “my guess would have been that the best use of taxpayer money was in the source countries in South America” — that it would be possible to stop cocaine before it reached the U.S. But what the study found surprised her. Overseas military efforts were the least effective way to decrease drug use, and imprisoning addicts was prohibitively expensive. The only cost-effective way to put a dent in the market, it turned out, was drug treatment. “It’s not a magic bullet,” says Reuter, the RAND scholar who helped supervise the study, “but it works.” The study ultimately ushered RAND, this vaguely creepy Cold War relic, into a position as the permanent, pragmatic left wing of American drug policy, the most consistent force for innovating and reinventing our national conception of the War on Drugs.
When Everingham’s team looked more closely at drug treatment, they found that thirteen percent of hardcore cocaine users who receive help substantially reduced their use or kicked the habit completely. They also found that a larger and larger portion of illegal drugs in the U.S. were being used by a comparatively small group of hardcore addicts. There was, the study concluded, a fundamental imbalance: The crack epidemic was basically a domestic problem, but we had been fighting it more aggressively overseas. “What we began to realize,” says Jonathan Caulkins, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University who studied drug policy for RAND, “was that even if you only get a percentage of this small group of heavy drug users to abstain forever, it’s still a really great deal.”
Thirteen years later, the study remains the gold standard on drug policy. “It’s still the consensus recommendation supplied by the scholarship,” says Reuter. “Yet as well as it’s stood up, it’s never really been tried.”
To Brown, RAND’s conclusions seemed exactly right. “I saw how little we were doing to help addicts, and I thought, ‘This is crazy,'” he recalls. “‘This is how we should be breaking the cycle of addiction and crime, and we’re just doing nothing.'”
The federal budget that Brown’s office submitted in 1994 remains a kind of fetish object for certain liberals in the field, the moment when their own ideas came close to making it into law. The budget sought to cut overseas interdiction, beef up community policing, funnel low-level drug criminals into treatment programs instead of prison, and devote $355 million to treating hardcore addicts, the drug users responsible for much of the illegal-drug market and most of the crime associated with it. White House political handlers, wary of appearing soft on crime, were skeptical of even this limited commitment, but Brown persuaded the president to offer his support, and the plan stayed.
via How America Lost the War on Drugs : Rolling Stone.
