I think this can be framed more effectively as , thinking of outcomes. S regulation is closer\/more correlated (I think) to the outcome compared with that of L regulation, and that is why I think it is better!<\/p>\n
I tend to agree with Tyler Cowen that individual moral propensities are less important than overall social context. To borrow from a different branch of social psychology, I would say that Packer is committing the Fundamental Attribution Error.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In my view, the problem comes from trying to use what I call letter-of-the-law regulation in finance. Call it L regulation. With L regulation, the regulator lays down specific, quantitative boundaries (think of risk-based capital requirements, with fixed numerical weights for various types of assets). The managers of financial institutions are told to stay within those boundaries.
\nIn contrast, think of something I might call S regulation, for spirit of the law. With S regulation, the manager of a financial institution that enjoys some government protection would take an oath to maintain the safety and soundness of the institution. With S regulation, it is wrong to just tiptoe along the edge of the quantitative boundaries, without considering the potential risk to the firm.
\nSuppose we take it as given that government is going to protect some of the liabilities of some institutions, because of deposit insurance, implicit guarantees, “too big to fail,” or other reasons. I would like to see such institutions be covered by S regulation even more than by L regulation.
\nI would like to see managers of government-protected institutions take an oath to safeguard the soundness of their companies. I would like to see them subjected to prison terms for violating that oath. The oath is a general promise, not satisfied simply by staying within the boundaries of L regulation.
\nI believe that S regulation would change the motives of bank managers. They would be looking for ways to avoid failure, rather than for ways to stay within the letter of the law.
\nThere can be plenty of risk-taking institutions in our society. But they should not at the same time be institutions that enjoy government protection when they fail.
\nEconomist’s View: “The Moral Stage of Wall Street”<\/a>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"I think this can be framed more effectively as , thinking of outcomes. S regulation is closer\/more correlated (I think) to the outcome compared with that of L regulation, and that is why I think it is better! I tend to agree with Tyler Cowen that individual moral propensities are less important than overall social … <\/p>\n