Saving this as it seems important.<\/p>\n
\nThat is\u00a0a new blog by Eric Lofgren<\/a>, an Emergent Ventures recipient.\u00a0 Here is an excerpt from\u00a0one post<\/a>:<\/p>\nThe story was from 1938. It sounds astounding to modern ears.\u00a0Congress did not earmark money for special projects.<\/b>\u00a0Pitcairn was a bit of a political entrepreneur by convincing his representative to get a project funded that funneled money back to his own district.
\nBack then, the Army and Navy were funded according to organization and object. Project earmarking only started becoming routine with the implementation of the program budget in 1949 (and really not until the rise of the PPBS in 1961).
\nI often say that the budget should be the most important aspect of defense reform, not the acquisition or requirements processes.
\nBy the way, the French parliament\u00a0doesn\u2019t earmark defense funding<\/a>. There\u2019s actually quite a bit to learn from the\u00a0French experience<\/a>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\nHere is\u00a0his post on cost disease in weapons acquisition<\/a>, and more on that\u00a0here<\/a>: \u201cIt\u2019s clear that defense acquisition costs are growing at least as fast, and probably much faster, than education and healthcare costs. Defense platform unit costs grow nominally from 7-11% per year. Doing some adjustments, DOD production costs probably\u00a0grow\u00a0twice the rate of inflation.\u201d
\nHere is\u00a0his general post on acquisition reform and the limits of decentralization<\/a>, maybe the best introduction to his overall point of view.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n